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A RE-EXAHH!/\i'ION 
. i  \• 
•  I 
Introducti-on · 
1.  This- papi~ examines  t~e trado  poli~y of  the  Co~munity towrirds 
Jspan.  _It  does  so  for  three  sets  of  reasons. 
'  . 
(s)  Our  trade  relation!i  \Jith  JarHm.·are  uns_~_!_isfa.~..!.9...C:L  .. 
!  - I  ,  I  .  . 
As  we  en~er. the  1980s,  the_ Community  is  dealing  vliti1  ·Jap~ri  oi· 
.r  !  -
_the  basis. of  9u-idelines  set  i_r-1- the  early.  1960~~.  Out· Jap<}n 1 
as~thc thi·rd  economic  po'n'er  of  the  free  world 1  feels, 
.. 
entitled to  a  r6Lc  of  equality with  the- Comm~n~ty and  the 
United  ~tatcs.  Given  its previous  performance  And  &conomic 
potentialp  it  is  in  tho  Community's  interest  to  devcl6p  with 
Japan  a  partnei'Ship  ~:hich  belongs  to  the: 1930s  and  stretches  .  ~  ....  .  .. 
froT  polit)ca·t ·questions  to  the  practice: of  t~chnolo'gical 
'  cooperation.  ·The aim  of  extending  cooperation  ~ith Japan· 
.  .  . 
s6  a~  to  cover  the  full  range  6f  areas  o~  mutual  concern  is 
hind~red,· howevor,  by_  the  maintenance  o~ national  protection-· 
ist measures~ 
. The  arrangements  we  have  are  dis~riminatory  Ca  source 
of  grbwi~g  resentment  in  Ja~~n quitp  out  of  pro~~rtion 
to  the  econo~ic  import~nce to  us  of  these  restrictionsj, 
a·re  embodied  ·in-a  patchi~ork o1  sep-arate  nationctl  trade 
restrictions  <more  a  ~elic of  the  1950s  than  a  Community 
··..  p.oticy  of  the  198,0s),  and  are  in fact  generally  fro:c:en 
·in a  pattern"£wenty  years  or  more  6ut _of  date. 
.. 
(b)  Our  preserit  pa~chwor~ of  largely  national  restrictions  ~ga~nst 
Japan  will  d~mage the  international  comoetivity  of  larae 
sectors  6f  the  Community•s  industri~s  in  the  1990s • 
. Differerices  in  national  treatment  are.bound  to.  lead  to  a·· 
disto~t{on of  c~nditions·o~  ~ompetition within.·the  Com~unity 
and_ a  c~nsequent  ~ndermining of  t~e  C~stoms  Union~  And  this 
p~rtit1oning of  natiori~l  markets  within  tho  Community  has  a  more 
.. 
•  ·" .I"  , a ..  2 • 
fundanH?ntaL''and  harmful  cf.fec't  than· di ~HldvDntaging 
·consumers  and.o~fending against  a  general  doctrine  •. 
'  .  .  ..  •':  ~  .  .  '  . 
It  weakens  the  inte'rriat; ona.l. competit  i vcness  of  Community 
,,  '  •  I  ••  •. ::  • ..  ,  t  ·~.'  ' 
industry:  '  '  .. 
-·Member  State  X engages  in  a  special  protective 
nr~angement· a~ainst Japan;  it  seeks  further 
protecti~n by  Article 115,  but  it. is  not  suf~ 
ficicnt  to  be  ·comp~titive only  in  its own  market, 
to prosper  it must  be  competitive  internati6nally; 
- thus  separate national  ~reatment  undermines  its· 
own  prosperity and  wfll  increase  its unemployment. 
(c)  Japan  is  one  of  the  major  gaps  in  the  Common  Cor~mercial  Policy. 
Thds  there  is  a  strong  argument  from  the  point  of  view  of 
industrial  policy foro  unified  policy;in  relation  to  quant-
itative  import  restrictions  against  Jaban •. And  here  there  is  .  ,. 
a  major  gap.  There  is  no  complete  and:'unified.Communit)'  policy 
-in  reLation  to  quanti~ative  import  resfrictions.·  IAdividual 
'Member  Statcs··maintain  a  variety of  di~criminatory import 
res~~ictions;  s~·called  volunta~y icstraint  arrangements  of  .  . 
equal  or  greater  importance  arc  negotiated  with  scant  regard 
.  I  .  -
fbr  Communitf  rules  by  ~ational  Government  and  industries  in 
Member  States  separately with  third  countries.  This  is part- . . 
icularly  the  cas~ ~i~h Japan. 
This  represents  a  gap  in  the  common  commercial  oolicy.  This 
gap  is  not ·mentioned  critically because  it conflicts  with'  so:ne. 
'idealistic  model  of  piogression  towards  E~ropean unity.  It ·is 
mentioned  because  ot  the  very  practical  reason  that  the  whole· 
/ 
strength  of  the  Com"munity  in.  its dealings·  w~th third ·countries 
lies  in its acting  together.  Only  by  this means  for  example 
was  it possible  in  the-Tokyo  Round.to  g~t  from  the  United  S~~tes 
~uch  conce~sions- unobtainab~e in  previous  GATT  negotiations.-· 
as  the  introductiori of  a  material  injury  test  and  the  abolition 
I 
of  American  Selling Price  for  chemicals. .  ·~. 
On  the  other  h~nd, equolly.clearly  for  Member  States to 
enga~o in  ncgoti~t~on~ on  th6ir  own  wi~h  third  countrie~ 
means. that  th~se can· .pli!Y  f·kmbcr  States off  ag·ainst  each  other; 
·thus  the  combined  strength  of  the  ·~ommtmity  is  spt it  and 
squandered  i~ our'dealings  with  the  external  \·iorld.  ThiS  c.an 
only  me.c1n  a  less effective.defencc· of.our  interests,  and 1'11ore 
jobs  lost. or  less opportunities  reulised,  than  \IOUld  have. b~en 
the  ~ase if the  6ombined  ~trength of  thci  Com~unity had  been. 
appAied.  All 'this  is  incrcasingl>' -relevant  in  cons:idering  the 
~r~~ing,pr~ssur~ ~f  Japinese  exports  and  the  Likely. worsening 
of  ~ur already  considerable. bilateral  tt~de deficit • 
. And  ono  fundamerital  point  needs  eonstantly to  be  rememb~red. 
' 
Any  m,;jor  derogation  fror1'  n  common  (i.e.  Co1:1munit>'  wide) 
i  '  '  .  • 
policy  on  im~~rts starids  in the  way  of  achieving  a  single. 
market  wh~ch  is  the  Community's  first  raison  d
1 ~trc.  ,.  --·------~-- :· 
. 2.  Hesitations 
.. 
Yhcse  considert:.tions  might·  encounter  certain hesitat.ions. 
B.  Hou  will  any  adjustment  of  the  present  national  restrictions 
work  out?. wnt  it ·result  in _the  abrupt  ending  of  the 
existing mechanisms,  leaving  the  industry  co nee rned  without 
any-protection,  or,  as  some  may ·tear.,  lead  to  a -system 
~hich is  ~~~e  re~tricti~e than  the  present  one?. 
be  \.'hat  do  we  get .i,n  return  for  abolishing quantitative 
restrictiqns'? 
3.  Jo  this  it  can  o~ly be  soid  that: 4. 
' a.  The  balance of protection in any  new  arrangement  rreeds 
to be  looked at case  by  case.  Generally  the  case for 
liberalisation..;. the  the long-term interest of·the 
cqmpetitiveness of our  own  industry  - is strong; c-. 
there could  be  exceptions;  the general  case  in relations 
to _these  is  co~sidered later. 
b.  Problems  do  not  get  any  easier.by being  postponed 
·and  the blunting of  the  competitive  edge  of  sectors 
of  Community  industry  (through quantitative restrictions) 
~ill. cqntinue apace.  In this context  the  Cornn1i ssion has 
certai~ independent responsibilities; It has  in particular 
,. 
- to decide  whether  to  grant  requests· for  the  application of 
Article  115; 
- to decide  whether  or  not  it  c~n and  should  make  the 
necqssary proposals  from  time  to  time  for  rdnewal  of 
e~;sting r~cmber  State  commercial  agreements  with  Japan; 
- to 'dt:-C'ide  whether  to  refer  arr~ngemcnts made  b'y  the 
Member  States  to  ~he  Court. of  ~usticc as  being  incomp-
atible  with  the  common  commer~ial policy; 
•  I 
"  to- ensure  ihe  app~ication of  the  principles  of  Community 
·competition policy. 
c.·  ln  rct~rn fo~  the  phasing  out  of  our  quantitativc.r~strictions, 
~e could  get  ~dt only_ the  removal  of  a  fest~ring sore  in  EC/Jaoan 
relations,  but  also  increased  acces~ in  terms·of  tariff  and  Quot~ 
·concessions  and  increased  EC  exports· (cxampl~s are  the  severe  guotas 
·o~ our  eiports of  leather· footuear  ~nd high  t~~iffs on  certain 
foodstuffs>. 
-· 
4.  The  present  state of  EC/Jap~n trade  re·lations 
.. 
The  present  situation has  the  following  main  features: 
a.  Three  regions  of  the  Community.  (UK,  France,  Benelux> 
have  bilateral  safequard  clauses  in  commercial  treaties 
'  ----~-~----------
.with  J~pan that  can  be  terminated by  the  Co~mission ceasing •  I- • 
Co 
to propose  their periodic  r(nH!W()lo  One  -rc~r~<'Jr1  (Ital}')  i·,a.~. 
a  power  -of  dero';iation for·  n  consid.crHbl~ nuwbe·r .of  1tcrn3  on 
·the common  liberuti-s.n.t.5on  lis\ in  respect  of  Japan  (the 
'  • 'l  ~  .... 
11experimental  list
11)a 
Residual  ~uantitative restrictions,  most  of  them  der~ved 
-.---...  ·,,  I 
·from  bilateral  treaties  with_ Japan,  are  hioiritained  by_ 
different  Member  States.~  Some  are  on  goods  which  arc 
.important  in  trade  but  ciany  a~e  an~cbronistic  ~r of  little 
ob~i6us  ~~lue.  Some  arc  selective  uq~inst Japan  in  tha 
I 
sense  thut the  quantibtive  restrictioli  is, r.1c:d·ntaincd  agninst 
a  n8mber  ~j  countries,  including  Japan~ but  not  against 
other  major  industrialised  trading  partners.  A few  aro  .  -
di.scriminatorx· against  Jnpan  i.n  t'h.e  sense  that  the  restrictior' 
i s  li'l o  'in t n  i ned  on l ~  a  g a  i n  s t  J a  p  <J. n  ~ 
There  are  a  number  of  1n'forrnnl  tlrrangen1e-nt~:·  re~tric'tino  ·-.  -·~---.:::--
·imports by  JaptH~, to  certo.in regions ;of  the  Cm;u·;,-..:.r.ity.  Some 
of  ~~1ese .s.re. in effect  periodica.l\y, reu.eg.otL:ted  (generail/· 
a-nnu&liy)o  Some.t.irnes  thera  is  an  il1")pression  that  ~~e~.1ber 
- ...  ,  I  .  . 
States  grant·  increased  ~cc~~s  fbr  Japane~c items  which  ari· 
subje~t  to  quantitative te;trictions  in~return for  Ja~anese 
.  .  .  \  .·  .  . 
. export fCStraint on  bther  items  or  for  other  advantages. 
d.  Request·s  are  made  for  Article. 1-15  protectiM  as  a  virtually 
inevitab(e  ~eiloction of  the  separate  national  trade  policies 
de,scri.bed  above. 
A table  ~tt~ched sets  out  det~ils·of. tho  di&crirninatory Quantitative 
rcstri~tions maintaiMed  by ·individual  Member  States  against  J~pan. 
·s ... The  ,process  of  extending  the  common  ·liberal'isatio·n  List  ran out  o1 
steara  in  the  early seventies.  Since  then  other .attempts  have  bee·n  maie 
by  ihe  Commis~ion to  make  pro~ress toward  a  common  polic~  vis~l-vis  Jap~~~ 
.  . .  ·. 
Progress  was  made  in  relation to the  elimination 6f  national  quantitaiiv~  .  '  . 
restrictions  in  t,hc  textfles  sector  follouing  bilateral- negotiations  under. 
t'he  Jiul1:ifibres  Arrpngement._  Sut  in  gen~ral  we  arc  still.~  longway  from 
a  common  6ommcrcial  policy  toua~ds Japan • 
.  ' 
.·~-.I .•• . . '- Q .. 
·  o.  the  negotiation  of  a  bilateral  trade  agreement  (covering 
··both  residua.l -quantitDti.ve  restrictions  and  co.mmunitarisation 
.  .  .  . .•  ...  .  '  .  '  .  . 
of  the  existing national  bilatoral  safeguard  clauses)  has·  ..  : 
been  suspended  for .~~~·~l·y.\l  d~dde;  . 
. b.  the  dtfference~ in• national  treatment  are  bound  to  lead  to 
a  distortion of  comp~tition .within  the  Community:  Article 115 
stands  in  the  backgro~nd partitioning the  Common  Market. 
c •. a  Comrn;is;:;ion  note  of  1976  drcH  the  llttention of  t1ember  States 
d. 
•···. 
to the  fact  that  the  negotiation  ~f.  bilateral quant1tative arrangc-
.ments/Has .not  .. compatible  with  Article  11·3·  and  th.at  only  the  Comr..u-
nity 'could  ~xcrciGe rights  under  national  bilateral. safeguard  clause~. 
Member  States  were  invited to  bri~g their sectoral  problems  to the 
Commission. 
MTN  safc~uards negotiations  covering  a  selective  a~plication 
of  Article  XIX  of  the  GATT  in  which  the  problem  of-residual  ...  ' 
quantitative  restrictions  could  h·ave  been·  "subs·umeO'!':·:Cas 
envisaged  by  the  Soames-Ohi ra  exchanges>  'have  no't  got  any\o~here. 
~ •.  neither~have Japanese  requests  in  the  MT~. for  a  start by  th~ 
Community.in  removing  discriminatory  qua~titative restrictions •. 
6.  U~satisfactory~conscaue~ces of  the  p~esent situation 
The· result  of  all thi5  is  a  confused  rn1xture  of varying  types  of 
.natio~al protective  arrangements  against  Japan.  For  the  reasons  set 
out  earlier this: 
a •.  stands· in  the  way  of  having  a  common  market  in  significant 
·sectors of  European.industr~ and  will  inc~easingly damage 
the  international c6mpetitiveness  of  these  sectors; 
b.  is not  th'e  best  deal  that  a  united .Community  could  achieve 
with  Japan;  ·-
c.  will  be'a  source  of  growing  friction  with  Japan,  atfe~t{ng 
the  general  develbpment  of  rolations  with  Japan. d.  will  mBke  it. 1~pr~ctic~blo to onvisDge  a  fully  satisfactory • 
trade  rcl8tiorishi"'t-Ji\!)  J~pan ~ rJith  ito highly  individual 
and  close  Gove~nmen~~\r~ust~y and  inter-industri  lin~s  ~ 
'  .  '  ·'.  ·" 
l~ithout  industrial cooperatio.n  os·.  ~major cornponent •.  ·Indeed.· 
some  of  th-ese  major  problems  bet\~een us  are  only  super1iciJtly 
reflcct~d in  trade  flows;  they  aro  in  essence  industrial.  But 
./ 
di~cussions on  specific indu~tria·l problems  canndt  effectively 
.,take,  place  untes's  in  the  conte>{t  of  an  ov'er·vll  Community  str<~tem:, 
I  .. 
towards  Japan. 
l 
7.  A Community.Strateny 
.. 
a.  In its relations  ~ith-Japon, the-Communityta  aim  is  to  2chieve  D 
·a .greater  degree" o'f  coopcrlltion ·over  the -\tholo  r'(}nge  of  f':'attc.rs 
of-mutual  concern.  The  t~o sides  h~ve  ~ajor 1nterests  in  co~mon, 
including  interests  relating  to .the  functioning  of  the  \iorld 
economic  and  t~ading systeM,  in  which  ~ey both.havd a  prio~ipal 
b •. 
'  .  .  . 
stake.  Increasingly,  however,:those  ~ntcrests cannot  be  safe~ 
guarded  unl~s.s· a  closer  identi.ty  of  v'i_cws  is established, ·1nc'.-
uding  a  greater  r~ad~~ess t6  take  occount  ~f each  ~th~r•s position. 
Matte~s like investment  and North-South relations are 
amongst  those which·r,muld  be  considered. 
Efforts  have  to be  ~ade on  both  sides  therefore, .within  the 
.  ' 
f~amework of  & broad  strategy,  in  the .direction of  re~oviog 
-· 
th~ existing  level  of  restricti6ns  on  tra~e.  In  part-icular 
.Japan  needs  to  make  concessions,  e~g. ·lls  regards  the  intensive 
--.-~-:-----
quantitative  restrictions  on  _Le·athcr  g_oods.and  the·h-igh 'tarHfs 
·on processe9  agricultural  products  and  various  other  goods. 
c.  On  th~ pc..rt  ·of 'the ·Corrrmuni ty,  e.pe.rt  fro;..--.1  the indispEmsabl  G 
effo~ts of  restruct\.l~ing,,  ~~~e·re  si1ou14  be.  a.  polit.ic~tl  read-: 
iness  to  phase  out .the  d1scnm1natory  auant1tat1Ve  rE?str1ct1cns 1  · 
.  .  . 
'etiminating·these  ~~ogrrisively in the  ligh~ of  th~ results 
obt~ined by  the  tommunity  strategy;  this would  alsQ  of  cqurse 
.  .  .  . 
. imply  ponsideration  o'f.  the  future  cif  the. individual  safeguard 
clauses  appl~~able to Japan.  The  ~ectors ~nvol~ed varr  considerably : 
in  serls~tivity,  and  whereas  a  consider~ble  numb~r of  ~he_quaniits-. 
t'\ve  r_est.r'i~tions  could  be  ended  quite  shortly,· in  other.  cases  tt:~ 
industries  concerned  would  need  time  i~  w~1ch to  ad~pt  themsetv~s to 
changes  in  the1r  competitive  situaiion.  At  Least  three  categories  ~­
the  quantit~t1ve  rest~ictions invotved·can  in  fact  be  broadly 'I 
.•.· 
I·  .  (i.?..  t.~~~~·thot Clln  be  rCnlOVOd  fafrly  ODSily; 
(i1) ·tho~e.~~crc progressive  l1bernl1sation may 
··be. t"e·a"s'io\c  on  ·a  b~·sis  of  recipr~city; 
(iii)  those  where  wide  an~ imp~rtant  interests  are 
at  stake,  ~nd where  large  adjust~ents  (including 
greater  specialisation or  restructuring on  the 
- EC. side:)  \Wuld  be  required. 
d.  In  ~he case  of· major difficulties;. it m~y be nec:essc:.ry 
to I  see:c  be.t-::-1een  the  Cornrrrcnity ·and  Japari agreement  for  tl".e 
tompor~ry rcstra,nt  of  Japanese  exports  while  European  industry· 
restructures.  These  exceptional-tases  would  only  occu~ in  the 
following  circumstances: 
~  ~hen they  conc~rned a  product  where  serious 
. -~industrial and  social difficulties uould  otherHise 
occur  as  a  result  of  Japanese  competition; 
"  the  restraint  uas  for  a  limited period  (normally  2 
to  4  year:·s); 
"  tho  protection  ~as accompanied  by  restructurina 
measures  of the  Coml'ii.'l.:ni ty'  s  industry as 
deten~ined in  appropri~te procedures; 
~the Community  undertakes  to  proceed to  libe~~tisation, 
on  a ·EC-wide·  basis,  •lithin a  specified peri1od. 
8.  An  clement  of  industrial  coopcraiion  would  form  part  of  the  m3tters  to 
be  discussed  with  Japan,  including such  aspects  ~s  contacts  between 
_  European  and  Japanese  indus~ry,  questions  of  investment  (both 
Japanese  in Europe  and  EuropeaFI  in Japa_n>,  and  possib.ilities of  collaboration w  9  .. 
in third country  projects~  A fu~ther,opening Up  of  th~ Japanese  ~arket to 
Community  exports  ~ould 
Dnd  in~us~rial ties·. 
, o  .•  Conclusions  ----
.  . 
al~o_·.c~i,t._ribute:to  thq  strenothening of  commercial. 
A strategy on  these  lines  seems  tho .only  one  which  would·prev~~t o  .· 
. growing  exacerbation of  our  tre:de -relutions  liith  Japnn  over. th.e  discdminatory,i· 
~ua~titative ~estrictio~s~ offer  D  cha~co of  increasing  access  to.the 
1 
Japaries~ market,  adequately  engage~ to  this  ~nd~the  joint  bargaining  power 
. of  the  CommuAi~y,  .. and  ensures  a  compe.titive  future  for  our ·key  indust.ries  on 
world  markets  in  the  1990s. .-~ .. 
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1  Misccl- .  ' 
lant'O\JS  •  .  . 
02.01  l·leat  0  1 
04.06  lioncy,  0  1 
22.09  Spirits  '  293,000  1 
t.O. 12  Ph.:: r~1acc uti  C.l l. art1clo9  1m.  1 
50.09  \:oven  si lie  2.3rn.  1 
57.10  Jute  fubrics  1,28,000  1 
58.0?  C.1rpcts  ' . ..  470,00()  1 
62.03  Sc:.cl:s  510,000 
I  1  1' 
6/.. 01  Foot11ear.  4"11 ,uOO  1 
. 6/.. 02  root~:ear  3.Sm.  '1  1 
66.01  Umbrellas  918,000  .  1  1 
66.03  U;;.~rclla parts  1.  8::~.  1 
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I  '  ,__  ... 
-~I Sectoral 
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'16.04  Cannt!d  fish  ·'33.~.  .· ·1  , 
32.05  Oycstu1fs.  22.4JJ.  1 
~7  .02 .  Films  ..  .  .  '  i.O  a •  ,  . 
40.11  Tyres  66  ,.  ,  1 
69.07/CS  Tiles  . .  19.4ra'.  z  t  2 
69.11/12  Tat)lea-3re  . 
40.7~.  2  2  .2  2 
73.02/15  Steel  - H'l.  ~a.  (  1 
73.32  Bolts  1t,Jn,  , 
~.2.09/14  Cutlery  ·.·  4t.  t.--:-...·  ~  ~  %  2 
I 
84.41  Se'11in9  !'llachinu  .  l/2.~:"\.  '{ 
Bt,. 62  Ball  bearings  104,8.'!1.  1  . 
8S.O,  Generators  61  rn.  1  I 
65.03/H.  8Hteries  31.5::~.  2  !  90.12  Optic~  l  ~;  c roscoou  . 
1:S.41il.  1  i 
90,28  El ec.  ~c~s.  in~tr.  65  ~.  1 
91.01/0V  \Ja·t c:he s,  clocks  1(;.6  ~.  6 
03/0?/  . 
09/11 
~ 
97.03  Toys  56.71il.  ..  1  1 
I 
<Total  27>  c;1,0::54 
j  .  !'.'1.)  (16)  ( 17)  (7)  c;D  ·<2> I  0~  ·'  . 
J  -
.. ·'·  ... ~ 2 ... 
.. 
EC  ir.~ports 
,  I 
: 
I 
CCT  Product  from  J~p2n  I  F  BNL.  0  OK  lRL  \.:K 
:  ·· ... ·  ·.(~979,  £) 
:,.,1  '  ' 
: 
.  '  ~·  ~.-·  .. 
III Con~umcr  ..  '  :.  I  . 
elect r  ()"; c  s.  I  .  ., 
85.15  ·T.v.,  rndio  951.4r.'l,  ~  1" 
65.?.1  T.V.·  tu~cs  302.9m.  1  I 
-
(Total .  2)  <S1,,251, .  r.t.)  (2)  (1)  . 
:  - " 
IV  Hat or  veh- .  ·,  :  ·rc-re·s- ~ n  .j  j 
'' 
reta.tcd~  •  :-
~ 
84,06  ~~otc.r  vehicles  2,E16.7m.  5 
87 .02/Q!,/  c.nd  p.:>rt::; 
05/06 
87.09112  llotor  cycles  and  parts  '617. 3m.  2 
•  1,.  I 
'·  ..  -
I 
.. 
Total .  7)  '·  (83,434  t;l, ),  (7)  .  ..( 
TOTAL  51 
...  ~·  .. _  .,  31  27'  9  3  2 
1- '  .. 
Expl~n~tory Noti 
1.  The  ta!:>l<'  shOHS  the  residual  qunntit1:tive  restrictior.s  ~ll1(1ttdned by  indio.ddu:~t 
•:e;;'lbcr  States  on  ir..-::orts  fro;;'!  J.:oan  '>!hich  arc  discrinir.atory  in  nature,  i."e.  wh  i~.'l  ~:-c 
not  a~plic~ble to  ihird  st~tcs ~~ncr~Lly dr  to  3ll-GATT  ~afti~~~  Tne  lis:  i~  ~ase:  =~ 
the  information  ;:vailable  to  the  Ccr.tnission;  in  sor.1e  cases  this  infor:::a~ion  is .ir::6rc:i>! 
1nd  there  ~ay  have.bec~ chang!s  ~hi~h· have  not  bein  not~fied to  the  co~~issi~~. 
2.  The  ite~.s  h'"ve  been  -;ro•JDed  in  four  cat£'gories.:  1  ~iiscellane-:us  <ite~s  .... hose 
impor't  value -is'  t>~tow  ~- 10  mil-Lion,  and  in  r.,any  .cases  belo'd  S  1  :nil lion); !l  Ite'"1s  -:;i 
sector~l  irn~orta~ce  (import·  ~aluc  a~ove S  10  million); ·1!1  Cons~mer electronlcs;  a~a 
IV  ~otor  vehicle~ and  related  items. 
·3. ·  The  third  colu::1n. which  sho'.ls  the  vcilu'c  of.  Co~,nuni ty  i::,por"ts  fro~ Japan  of· the  -~:::s 
concerned  provides- an  indication  oi  the  relative  irn;:>ortance  of  the  trade  a!'\d  s_ec~:r  . 
'involved.  'The  figures  ~uotcd,  which are  based  on  ~urostat  statistics ·for  1979,  are 
for  full  tariff positions  (four  digits}  either  :·cal  in  ~ases wnerc  the  Quantitative 
restriction applies  to  the  futl  position;  or  (b)  .... here· it  is  Mt possible  to  ce:.O'~~·~~e 
-
·the exact  equivalence  betwten  Eurostat  tariff sub-positions  and  the  su6-oosition~ ~r~~~. 
the  Member  ~tate or  Stat~~ ac~ly rcstrictiohs •.  Where  it has  been  pos~ibl~ to •Li;"  .. :~! 
.Eurostat· sub-positions  more  clos~ly with  the  res~ricted  sub-positions  this  has  been  ::~ 
4;  In  oddHion  to  t·he  quantitative  restrictions  listed,  th1:1re  are  certiliri 'volu.nt:~Y 
·restraint  arrong~ments  whi~h ore  given  support  by  GovernmentsJ  notably  in  the  .  . 
elet\ronics  and  motor  vehicle  sectors. 